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Few people did as much to shape Canada’s Second World War effort, and no single 
person did as much to shape the Canadian army, 
as did General H.D.G. “Harry” Crerar. As chief 
of the general staff during the critical year and a 
half following the fall of France in June 1940, he 
was the primary architect of First Canadian Army, 
established the conditions for the army’s training 
and expansion, and advised the government 
to dispatch troops to Hong Kong. As a corps 
commander, he campaigned for Canadian 
involvement in the Dieppe raid. And, by 1944, he 
had assumed command of the army, eventually 
leading a combined Commonwealth army – the 
largest ever commanded by a Canadian – during 
the Rhineland offensive. His views on the form 
Canada’s military contribution should take 
became policy, even though many opposed them, 
including Prime Minister Mackenzie King. 
 Crerar’s achievements (and failures) are 
explainable, in part, by the nature of the crisis 
facing Canada and the Commonwealth during 
the Second World War. Nazi Germany was on the 
verge of victory in the summer of 1940 and the 
logic of that situation seemed to dictate, at least 
in hindsight, that Canada, united in the face of 
this clear threat to national survival, indeed to 
western civilization, commit itself to an all-out 
war effort. From that starting point, Canada’s 
military effort – a full field army (First Canadian 
Army) and at war’s end, the third largest navy 
and the fourth largest air force – seemed logical. 
But there was nothing predetermined about 
Canada’s war effort. In the words of a recent 
critical review of a book on the “fateful choices” 
made that summer, “more than most periods in 
history, the summer of 1940 was pregnant with 
a veritable brood of…plausible futures.”1 
 That was true for Canada as well. But 
Crerar’s ability to shape that future was also a 
product of the ambiguity that the fall of France 
introduced into a civil-military balance that 
traditionally marginalized the military. Combined 
with the strategic vacuum left by the new 
constitutional relationship with Great Britain, 
the summer of 1940 saw what might have been 
the first true debate about how Canada should 
exercise its independence in pursuit of national 
interests. If the country’s primary strategic goal 
was to ensure the defeat of Germany, the most 
immediate priority was to stave off the defeat of 
Great Britain. Mackenzie King, however, recalling 
the  severe political divisions of the First World 
War, believed that his goal was to bring Canada 
through the war intact. Crerar, among others, 
pursued different goals – he believed that Canada 
must emerge from the war with a more robust 
military and a recognition that responsibility for 
national defence was shared between politicians 
and the military. And, he believed, the country 
needed a greater appreciation of the costs of 
sovereignty. He saw himself as a steward of the 
Canadian army, and this too shaped his goals. He 
met resistance, not least from Mackenzie King, 
and this shaped his methods. And the nature 
of the war itself shaped the results. In the end, 
he was a general who acted as if he wielded an 
instrument of national power in the national 
interest, before these concepts had been given 
concrete form by a country and government that 
had no machinery to develop or articulate them. 
He conceived a field army that could achieve 
what in today’s parlance would be strategic effect, 
a military that is relevant. That is a military 
force that can make a strategic contribution to 
the defeat of the enemy, as well maintains its 
capabilities and continue to fulfil national roles, 
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including increasing Canada’s international 
influence and capacity to shape the international 
environment. The results took the form of First 
Canadian Army, as well as a significant naval and 
air effort, but that effort came at a cost. Canada’s 
role in 1940 was not clear. Crerar played an 
important, indeed critical, part in defining the 
country’s war effort. The issues he grappled with 
– how does Canada engage the world? what are 
its interests? and how could it best exercise its 
interest on the international stage? – were as 
complex and as difficult then as they are today. 
 Crerar was, like all of us, a child of his 
particular time. From Crerar’s perspective, 
the predominant theme during his life was 
the emergence and evolution of a Canadian 
nationalism that distanced itself from its British 
origins. That this theme was one of the crucial 
subtexts in Crerar’s life was no surprise given 
both his family background and his chosen 
profession. During the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries Canada was evolving and a nascent 
Canadian national identity was maturing, or 
at least emerging. Crerar was engaged in some 
of the turning points of that growth. For the 
better part of his life, Crerar, like many of his 
contemporaries, saw no conflict in being British 
and Canadian. Today, we tend to understand 
the relationship as evolving sequentially from 
one to the other, but it was rarely that neat. In 
the 1930s, he described himself as a “British 
subject, and a Canadian national” – these were 
not incompatible. Linda Colley suggested, in her 
study of the emergence of a British identity, that 
identities are not like hats; you can wear more 
than one.2
 Crerar’s life was shaped by Canada’s 
constitutional and political development. Born 
in Hamilton, Ontario in 1888, he was raised by 
fiercely imperialist parents, educated at Upper 
Canada College and the Royal Military College, 
went to war in 1914 and joined the permanent 
force in 1919.3 Queen Victoria was on the throne 
when he was born. As Crerar grew up under 
Sir John A. Macdonald and Sir Wilfrid Laurier, 
the country had no navy, no constitutional role 
in foreign policy, and the United States was 
considered a major threat. It had no air force; 
flight was in its infancy. Crerar was 11 when 
the Boer War broke out; he was 22 when MPs 
became salaried; and he went overseas in 1914 
at the age of 26. He was 32 when the universal 
franchise was introduced and 43 when the 
Statute of Westminster was enacted. He was 58 
when Canadian Citizenship Act became law and 
the current Canadian flag was adopted the year 
of his death in 1965.
 Crerar certainly represented a particular 
constituency in Canada, but the clarity and 
assurance he brought to bear on events following 
1940 was the result of personal encounters with 
the history of the period. The First World War 
and the interwar period – and it was when it 
became the “interwar” period that its influence 
was most keenly felt – were formative ones for 
Crerar. His ideas on the military were planted 
before his wrenching experiences during the 
First World War, but the trauma of that conflict 
cemented in his mind the belief that a strong, or 
at least professional, military was necessary to 
protect Canada’s interests and promote Canadian 
sovereignty. 
  His desire to promote defence preparations 
was also intensely personal. The First World 
War was a family trauma for the Crerars. His 
younger brother Malcolm was killed, another 
severely wounded, and the stress and losses 
undoubtedly contributed to his mother’s death 
in 1919. Crerar himself was nearly killed at the 
Second Battle of Ypres in April 1915 and lost 
many friends over the next three years. The war’s 
impact was evident in his diary entry from June 
1915, as he pondered the deaths of friends and 
his experiences of the past two months:
The pity of this killing business gets me 
sometimes. War is so very truly hell and this yard 
by yard fighting finds it at its worst. The gains 
are so small when it comes to distance – it just 
resolves itself into a case of counting corpses, if 
we have fewer than they, it’s a “victory.” There is 
no romance in such as that. We’ll beat them some 
day but they’ll never be able to pay their just debt, 
the swine, not in this world anyway.4
Even at the end of the Second World War, Crerar 
refused to meet with his counterparts on the 
German side to take their surrender, sending his 
corps commanders, Lieutenant-Generals Charles 
Foulkes and Guy Simonds – “I saw no purpose in 
meeting any German generals unless I had to on 
some official capacity,” he recalled, “…I have had 
them in adjoining fields…that was enough.”5
 The First World War was personally traumatic 
for Crerar, but it became futile only in retrospect 
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as a new war loomed. The 
memory of formidable 
reputation Canada’s 
army had gained and the 
loss of professionalism 
in the 1920s and 30s, 
as well as the personal 
costs shaped his agenda, 
from his appointment 
as chief of the general 
staff to army command. 
Crerar was authentic in 
his pursuit of a mature 
national defence policy 
process and military 
professionalism. He 
may have be calculating 
in his pursuit of his 
objectives, but he was 
also principled. He 
was ambitious, but 
it was harnessed to a 
purpose.
 Crerar joined the 
permanent force soon 
after the war ended. He 
had a slow but steady rise 
as a staff officer. Postings 
to Ottawa and the UK, 
particularly time at the 
Staff College, Camberley 
and the Imperial Defence 
College, marked him as 
an officer on the rise. The 
promise of the immediate 
postwar period, when 
Crerar could boast 
o f  t h e  n e w f o u n d 
professionalism of the 
Canadian permanent 
force, however, gave way to disillusionment in the 
late 1920s and frustration by the 1930s. As the 
international environment grew more ominous, 
the military’s influence remained marginal, 
leading Crerar to characterize this period as the 
“stagnant backwaters of the interwar army.” 
 Crerar was as proud of the record of Canadian 
Corps as he was distraught at the cost of obtaining 
it. And as he watched its professionalism 
dissipated, his frustration grew. For Crerar, 
this process paralleled, and was fuelled by, 
the growing autonomy 
from Britain. However, 
this trend seemed to 
develop with little sense 
of what autonomy and 
sovereignty meant. From 
a defence perspective, 
there was nothing to fill 
the vacuum that would 
be left if the relationship 
to  the  Br i t ish  was 
completely abandoned. 
These concerns were 
evident in a speech given 
in 1926 to the Royal 
United Service Institute 
and later published 
in Canadian Defence 
Quarterly:
The great war terminated 
with the military forces 
of the Empire a unified 
fighting organization… 
[Despite the current 
d i v i s i o n s ,  p u b l i c 
sentiment would insist 
that Canada fight with 
the UK] when war again 
threatens, however, our 
responsibility as soldiers 
stands clear – against 
that day to prepare 
the military machinery 
of the Empire for its 
highest effectiveness.6
C r e r a r  h a d  b e e n 
overseas for several 
years at that point, but 
his pronouncements 
caught the attention of 
O.D. Skelton, under 
secretary of state for External Affairs, in Ottawa, 
who described them as “out and out advocacy 
of Imperialist [sic] policy in defence.”7 General 
staff officers’ talks were carefully monitored for 
any discussions of policy, an approach which 
prompted most senior officers to err on the 
side of caution. A year later, General Andrew 
McNaughton cancelled a proposed talk on 
“Canadian defence problems.”8
  As Canada’s constitutional position changed 
during the 1920s and 1930s, Crerar’s nationalism 
Lieutenant-Colonel H.D.G. Crerar, photographed 
in London during the First World War.
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also took a different form. He was more politically 
aware and more pragmatic. He reconsidered 
the military’s relationship to a maturing nation 
and concluded that the proof of that maturity 
was its willingness to defend itself. He saw 
Canada’s defence preparations in the context of 
a more mature partnership. He still remained 
committed to the Commonwealth, but believed 
that national sovereignty was more than a 
declaration in a document. It was the result of 
public engagement and the implementation of 
serious policies. If Canada was now a partner 
with Great Britain, then at the very least it had to 
take its responsibilities seriously. Local defence 
was the least it could do. It was not clear that the 
government shared this view. To be fair, neither 
did much of the public. During his tenure as the 
Director Military Operations & Intelligence from 
1935 to 1938, he worked hard to promote his 
ideas, convinced that the logic of his ideas would 
bear fruit if enough people were exposed to them. 
However, the results were minimal. 
 Germany’s invasion of Poland brought 
some clarity to the issue, but not as much as 
the nostalgic glow which memories of that war 
suggest. Canada’s role was not immediately clear. 
Prime Minister Mackenzie King intended that 
Canada’s effort, and liability, would be strictly 
limited. He pressed hard to ensure 
that Canada’s contribution would 
be industrial and agricultural; 
militarily, he focused on the 
air force as the cheapest and 
most cost-effective contribution 
Canada could make, at least in 
terms of lives. In the spring of 
1940, Mackenzie King argued to 
a Cabinet War Committee torn 
over whether to create a two-
division corps that even this was 
excessive: “We could have used 
our money more effectively if it 
had all been confined to air and 
naval services.” He conceded 
that the “national spirit, however, 
demanded an expeditionary 
force; would demand it having full 
national expression. I stressed 
the necessity of maintaining the 
pride and the morale of the little 
force we have by making them a complete entity.” 
J.L. Ralston, then minister of finance, agreed.9
 The fall of France in June 1940 lifted some 
of the constraints on Canada’s war effort, but 
King did not immediately expand the military. 
Memories of First World War casualty lists and 
divisive debates over conscription were foremost 
in his mind. At the height of the crisis, on 5 June, 
Mackenzie King spoke to the Liberal caucus on 
the “necessity of keeping Canada united and our 
war effort being based on that: of balancing all 
matters, going just as far as we could, and not 
so far as to create a worse situation than the 
one we were trying to remedy.”10 It is not clear 
if Mackenzie King truly believed that a united 
Canada was worth the cost of a defeated Britain 
and a Nazi-dominated Europe, but, if he meant 
it in a narrow sense, there was some logic to his 
view that broken armed forces could be rebuilt 
faster than the country. In either case, in his 
mind, the limits of Canada’s war effort were 
prescribed by this goal. 
 Crerar had no doubts that Canada’s army 
contribution had to be significant and that 
Canada should share the costs and risks with 
the British. He saw a large army as a critical 
contribution to the defeat of Germany, and a 
Major-General Crerar shakes hands 
with Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie 
King.
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logical step after the effort in the First World 
War, one that might prevent a “return to the 
stagnant backwaters” of the interwar period. 
Crerar believed that Germany would only be 
defeated when its army was defeated. It is also 
clear that he saw Canada’s contribution in terms 
of a British Commonwealth coalition, dictated 
by both sentiment and the logic that Canada’s 
military was organized, equipped and trained 
along British lines. He believed that Canada’s 
effort must be shaped by its own interests. And 
Crerar knew the effects he sought.
 This was evident from the first days of the 
war. When Crerar was sent to Great Britain in 
1939 to establish what became Canadian Military 
Headquarters (CMHQ), he lobbied hard for the 
infrastructure for a larger effort than the one 
or two divisions envisioned by the Canadian 
government, and to establish principles for 
Canadian autonomy.11 He was embarrassed by the 
parsimony of the government, not least because he 
recognized the contradictory impulses of seeking 
autonomy while insisting that someone else foot 
the bill. In the spring of 1940, for example, before 
a corps was formed, he and Lester Pearson, first 
secretary at the Canadian High Commission in 
Britain, warned of the poor impression being left 
by the government’s insistence that the British 
pay for non-divisional support troops.12 The best 
example of how he saw the exercise of autonomy 
occurred as the French armies were collapsing 
following the evacuation at Dunkirk. In June 
1940, as the British considered returning to 
the continent to shore up the collapsing French 
armies, Crerar advised them, “In my view, and 
I believe the view of the Canadian Government, 
the Canadian forces now available over here 
should be regarded as available to accept the 
same responsibilities, however dangerous, as 
those which it was proposed to allot to similar 
British formations.”13 The Canadian government 
was less confident, but Crerar forged ahead. And 
by the summer of 1940, he was in a position to 
pursue his aspirations. 
 Appointed chief of the general staff in July 
1940, Crerar took an expansive view of his 
responsibilities. He saw himself as a steward 
of the army’s professionalism and as the 
government’s chief military advisor, a combination 
that informed his approach to army expansion. 
Crerar genuinely believed a large ground force 
was necessary to defeat Germany. He was 
Prime Minister King reviews an honour guard from the Royal 22e Régiment
during a visit to their training camp in Surrey, England, 26 August 1941.
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equally committed to ensuring that when the war 
ended, the armed forces did not return to their 
previous state. “We must not lose a moment,” he 
emphasized in a memorandum for the minister 
of national defence written as Crerar returned 
from the UK, ”in undertaking a thorough analysis 
of Canada’s post-war military requirements and 
in planning a defence organization which will 
produce our future service needs with a maximum 
of efficiency and a minimum of expense.” A truer 
expression of his feelings was excised from the 
first draft of the memo: “Even should victory be 
gained it is as certain as anything can be that…the 
armed forces of Canada…will not be allowed to 
slip back into the stagnant backwaters of their 
pre-war existence.” 
    Over the next year and a half Crerar 
set about trying to make that goal a reality. 
He established conditions for 
expansion, enlarged the training 
infrastructure and the period 
of training from one month 
to four; cultivated media and 
political support; and enhanced 
his position relative to other 
chiefs and branch heads to 
ensure he was the chief military 
advisor. Most important, in 
successful struggles for army 
expansion in fiscal years 1940-
1, and 1941-2, he convinced a 
reluctant J.L. Ralston, minister 
of national defence, and many 
on the Cabinet War Committee, 
first that a large field army effort 
was necessary and then that it 
was feasible without resort to 
conscription. This was no mean 
feat, and the other services 
copied his approach, with similar 
successes. Concerned over the general staff ’s 
continual call for more men, an exasperated 
Ralston admitted to Grant Dexter in 1941, “[I 
am] minister but must act upon the advice of [my] 
staff of professional soldiers. Being a civilian, [I 
cannot] set aside [my] advisors simply because 
[I] disagreed with what they said. They knew; [I] 
did not know.”14 Ralston’s comment captured 
J.L. Ralston, minister of national 
defence, visits the troops in England. C
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McNaughton’s by-election loss in February 1945 was 
viewed by many as a rebuke of King’s war policies 
and his handling of conscription. McNaughton was 
“mystiﬁed” at his loss, but he was pilloried by many 
editorial writers, including those from the Globe (the 
cartoon accompanied the editorial), for what they 
characterized as his failure to support his army. Despite 
what seemed like a vote of conﬁdence for Crerar’s 
view of the role of the military in rendering professional 
advice to their political masters, as suggested by the 
cartoon, his inﬂuence was on the wane. Note: the Crerar 
identiﬁed in the cartoon is T.A. Crerar, not Harry Crerar.
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perhaps the most significant change that had 
occurred in the summer of 1940 – the military 
were viewed as the principal advisors to the 
minister, sharing responsibility for defence policy. 
Soon the army, as well as the navy and air force, 
expanded to unprecedented sizes. First Canadian 
Army, Canada’s first field army, became a reality 
in 1942. Crerar had by then been appointed 
general officer commanding (GOC) 2nd Canadian 
Infantry Division, and, after some debate, as 
Acting GOC 1st Canadian Corps. 
 Crerar’s goals and influence also manifested 
themselves in the pursuit of operational experience 
for the Canadian army. The relationship between 
his pursuit of the expansion of the army, the 
dispatch of troops to Hong King and participation 
of Canadian troops in the Dieppe raid is not 
often remarked upon, but they were tied 
together in Crerar’s mind not just as necessary 
for maintaining morale, and public interest in 
the army, but also for their effect on Canada’s 
status as a partner with the British and their 
potential impact on the postwar status of the 
military. By late 1940, Crerar was concerned 
about the army’s inexperience and during 1941 
and 1942 contrasted its relative inactivity with 
the sustained combat of the First World War 
Canadian Corps and the heavy fighting by other 
Commonwealth armies during the early years of 
the Second World War. Here he was out in front 
of the government. In December 1940, when in 
the UK to seek British opinions of the expansion 
of the army, Crerar pressed Sir John Dill, chief 
of the imperial general staff, on whether there 
was any desire to use Canadians in Libya. When 
Dill indicated that the British preferred that the 
Canadian formations remained in the UK, Crerar 
stressed that he “knew of no desire on the part of 
the Canadian government to discourage the use of 
its forces ‘in any operations in which they could 
usefully play a part, no matter where the theatre 
might be.”15 Mackenzie King was less certain, 
opposing any such commitment, reasoning that 
Canada had no interests in the “Empire War” and 
that “we owed it to our men to seek to protect 
Queen Elizabeth ﬂanked by Generals Andrew McNaughton and Harry Crerar.
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their lives.” Further he suggested, somewhat 
oddly, that fighting in the interests of the empire 
might even “engender annexationist sentiment in 
Canada.”16
 Crerar’s perspective was also evident in his 
support for the decision to send Canadian troops 
to Hong Kong as part of the Anglo-American 
attempt to deter the Japanese from entering the 
war. When asked in September 1941 whether 
Canada could spare troops to reinforce the 
garrison at Hong Kong, Crerar warned of the 
attendant military risks, and suggested that no 
commitment should hinder the preparations 
and build-up of Canadian forces in the UK. Still, 
he believed that if the British had already made 
the decision to reinforce the garrison, then the 
question of whether Canadian troops should 
be sent was ultimately a political and moral 
decision.17 There were other influences, of course. 
He believed that that the army needed action 
during crucial period of expansion, and his own 
study of the Pacific situation and Hong Kong’s 
position convinced him that Japanese would 
choose the rational course since they could not 
beat the British Commonwealth and the United 
States, an opinion shared by many Japanese 
leaders. But Crerar believed it was ultimately a 
moral and strategic question, and he framed it in 
coalition terms, echoing his comments of June 
1940: if the British (and the United States) had 
decided it was worth the risk to reinforce their 
forces in the Pacific, how could Canada say no? 
 When overseas in 1942, as the acting GOC, 
1st Canadian Corps, the same concerns and 
logic informed his ongoing support of raids and 
then the Dieppe operation, even as it outgrew 
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Lieutenant-General H.D.G. Crerar explains the plan for Operation “Totalize” to war correspondants
assembled at First Canadian Army Headquarters, Amblie, France, 7 August 1944.
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the concept of the small, limited coastal raids 
in which he had hoped his troops could obtain 
some experience. He believed Canadian morale, 
domestically and in the army, was hurt by the 
knowledge that Canadian troops trained and 
waited while others fought. He saw small raids, 
like First World War trench raids, as providing 
experience and action, enhancing morale.18 And 
so much the better if it stimulated domestic 
support for army in Canada, and maintained 
voluntary enlistment, something made even more 
important, ironically, by the potentially negative 
impact of the Royal Commission investigating the 
dispatch of troops to Hong Kong.19 And finally, 
he felt Canada must take the same risks as the 
British and the Allied coalition.
 The results of the Dieppe raid, combined 
with the diminished threat of Allied defeat by 
1943, changed the civil-military dynamic back in 
favour of the politicians. This manifested itself 
in the tighter control over commitments exerted 
by the government. This did not translate into 
a refusal to commit, but it did remove some 
of the discretionary authority of the senior 
commanders of the overseas forces. Indeed, 
there was at the same time a growing concert 
of voices that it was in the national interest to 
commit the Canadian forces in some decisive 
fashion, a policy which also ran counter to the 
view of some in the military, most notably General 
Andrew McNaughton, the senior Canadian army 
officer in England. After Dieppe, Mackenzie King 
wrote in his diary “somehow I cannot help feeling 
that it would have been better had all our forces 
been kept intact, until the moment when it was 
absolutely advisable to attempt invasion.” He did 
concede it might prove to “be for the best…in the 
long run.” But, in the fall of 1942, he prevented 
McNaughton from accompanying Churchill to the 
Soviet Union where the latter planned to examine 
a possible “northern” campaign; King was wary 
lest McNaughton’s involvement be construed as a 
commitment.20 By 1943, King made it clear that 
he was prepared to defer to British views as to 
how Canadian forces could be best employed, “as 
Crerar (left) examines a map with Air Marshal Arthur Coningham, commander of 2nd Tactical Air Force, General B.L.M. 
Montgomery, commander of 21st Army Group and Air Chief Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory, commander of the Allied 
Expeditionary Air Forces, Normandy, August 1944.
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one great Army” or “divided up,” an indication of 
his mistrust of his own generals.21 McNaughton 
was opposed to such a division, but Crerar 
continued to favour splitting the army, and 
the government, while it remained equivocal, 
asserted its control over any decision that might 
lead to a commitment or the perception of a 
commitment. 
 McNaughton continued to resist the breakup 
of the Canadian army through mid-1943, a 
position which diminished his status in the 
eyes of the British and many Canadians. Crerar 
felt that McNaughton was now “unable to stand 
back and view the whole picture.” Indeed, Crerar 
told High Commissioner Vincent Massey that he 
disagreed with almost all of McNaughton’s ideas 
about the army.22 Brooke noted McNaughton’s 
almost “fanatic antagonism for employing any 
portion of the Canadian Forces independent from 
the whole.” Like Crerar, Brooke believed that the 
employment of a Canadian division was becoming 
an absolute necessity to “provide an outlet to post 
officers and men to gain experience.”23 Crerar 
pushed for a Canadian deployment to the Italian 
theatre in 1943, against the wishes of his mentor 
McNaughton. In the end, Crerar’s view prevailed, 
but his success reflected, at least in part, the 
government’s wariness of too much dependence 
on advice from their own generals. In July 1943 
1st Canadian Infantry Division, followed later 
by 1st Canadian Corps, was dispatched to the 
Mediterrenean. McNaughton was soon sent back 
to Canada, and, after much discussion with the 
British senior command, Crerar was selected to 
replace him. 
 When Crerar officially became army 
commander in March 1944, his aggressive 
views on deployments were evidently a concern 
for the Mackenzie King government. In April 
1944, the government demanded a statement 
from Crerar on the feasibility of the Normandy 
operation, indicating that this would allow 
them to issue instructions regarding Crerar’s 
responsibilities to the government and First 
Canadian Army’s position within 21st Army 
Group. The government was basically asking for 
a guarantee of the operation’s success. Crerar 
feared he was being prepared as a sacrificial lamb 
The senior ofﬁcers of First Canadian Army, photographed in May 1945. (l. to r. - seated) H.S. Maczek, Guy Simonds, 
Harry Crerar, Charles Foulkes, Bert Hoffmeister; (standing) R.H. Keeﬂer, A.B. Matthews, H.W. Foster, R.W. Moncel, 
S.B.Rawlins.
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in the event that the landing failed and balked 
at providing such assurances.24 He eventually 
delivered a qualified assessment. Field Marshal 
Montgomery also tried to use Mackenzie King’s 
doubts to limit Crerar’s right of recourse over 
Montgomery’s head to the Canadian government, 
and, somewhat astonishingly, almost succeeded 
with Mackenzie King’s help. Crerar’s determined 
rejoinders to Montgomery – “Though in practice 
I expect to be treated, and behave, as any other 
Army Commander, in principle I…am not. I 
am the Canadian Army Commander and, as 
such, am in a different category to the British 
Army Commander”25 – prompted concern 
amongst Crerar’s colleagues that the British 
might lose confidence in the Canadian military 
leadership’s judgment if the military appeared 
more “constitutionally minded than [their] 
political masters.”26
 To Crerar, and many of his colleagues, 
the question was as much one of national 
sovereignty as respect for their professional 
perogatives. How could Canada clamour for 
recognition of its autonomy, but not accept 
the consequent responsibility and develop 
mechanisms accordingly? Of course, Prime 
Minister Mackenzie King recognized this equation, 
but unlike his First World War counterpart, Sir 
Robert Borden, consultation was enough for 
King. He did not seek influence. His goal was to 
avoid divisions at home. The Canadian senior 
command drew different conclusions from the 
experience of the First World War and was often 
out in front of their political masters in seeking 
strategic influence and recognition as the logical 
consequence of Canada’s contributions to the war 
effort. 
 These issues simmered for months, 
reemerging as the reinforcement crisis in the 
late summer and early fall of 1944 prompted 
an outcry in Canada. They peaked with the 
conscription crisis in the fall of 1944. Crerar, 
though he would not comment publicly, believed 
conscription was necessary and saw the issue 
largely in terms of public education. Despite the 
introduction of conscription, the influence of 
the military was clearly on the wane. This was 
evident as the end of the war loomed. By early, 
1945 Crerar pressed for the army to be reunited, 
and sought government promises on the shape 
of postwar army as well as the occupation and 
Pacific forces. His desire to maximize the effect 
of the returning soldiers while retaining as much 
expertise for the postwar army as possible also 
shaped his approach to demobilization. Crerar 
was confident that the civil-military dynamic 
had changed, and he encouraged his son Peter 
to stay in the permanent force: “I believe that 
the Canadian Active Army of the future will be a 
much finer organization than the old Permanent 
Force of the past.”27
 Still, as the war ended, Crerar feared that the 
country might lapse into its traditional malaise 
when it came to defence and the military. In his 
view, national perspectives and policies remained 
absent, a result of the expansion of the vote with 
no concurrent expansion of civic education, 
a narrow, self-interested outlook exacerbated 
by the introduction of salaries for members 
of Parliament.28 At war’s end, as he sought to 
preserve the core of the army’s professionalism, 
he believed that the necessary corollary was the 
promotion of ideas on civics to the “average” 
Canadian soldier whose lack of knowledge of 
national and international affairs, and poor 
physical condition had come as a shock to him. 
Crerar introduced civic education courses  such 
as “The Organization and Operation of Different 
Systems of National Government,” and “The 
Place of Religion in Society.” Attendance was 
voluntary, but characterized as “high.” As the 
soldiers became restless waiting to be returned 
to Canada, Crerar reminded his commanders 
of the importance of providing the soldiers with 
information “or guidance” on citizenship, religion, 
rehabilitation and demobilization. To Crerar, the 
veterans would provide the foundation for a more 
mature postwar defence policy.29 Even after the 
war, Crerar continued to promote his view that 
military service was one of the best means of 
producing national awareness. 
 After 1945, however, the appetite for views 
like Crerar’s was limited. It seemed as if Canada 
could avoid major conflicts, carving out a military 
role as an honest broker in international relations 
while remaining committed to the western 
alliance, its military contribution significant but, 
with the notable exception of Korea, untested in 
war. The end of the Cold War, the terrorist attacks 
of 9/11 and Canada’s mission in Afghanistan 
have again raised important questions about 
Canada’s defence policy, its security interests and 
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the role its military in particular should play in 
securing those interests. The past should provide 
perspective on these issues, but only if properly 
understood. For Canadians, the Second World 
War remains the measure of what war is, and 
should be: an unequivocal cause, an unambiguous 
threat, clear goals, a population united to achieve 
that goal, an all-out effort, definable steps 
towards a victory and a precise ending. These 
are comforting memories in complex times, but 
false ones. The warm nostalgic glow that seems 
to be enveloping that period combined with the 
clarity that comes from knowing the outcome of 
decisions and the distance from events masks 
the difficult and complex issues decision-makers 
faced during the war. Determining Canada’s 
contribution to staving off Britain’s defeat and 
then winning the war against the Axis was 
anything but clear-cut. There was nothing pre-
determined about Canada’s Second World War 
effort, however proudly we now look back on 
that very substantial contribution. It does not 
diminish that effort to examine the discussions 
surrounding how Canada could best advance 
and safeguard its interests. It is somewhat 
anachronistic to discuss the war in terms of 
interests as there was no real strategic culture 
during that period nor was there a tradition of 
trying to formally define Canada’s interests. But 
that does not mean that Canada had no interests 
or that no one had ideas on what they might 
be. There was dissension if not public debate 
surrounding the direction Canada’s war effort 
should take, and if the resulting contributions 
brought Canada benefits and influence, they 
also came at a cost. And that too is a point that 
should not be lost as we continue to debate how 
best Canada and Canadians should engage with 
the world.
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